Family Law: Parent and Child by Solender, Ellen K.
SMU Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 5
1983
Family Law: Parent and Child
Ellen K. Solender
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, 37 Sw L.J. 111 (1983)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol37/iss1/5
FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K Solender*
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
URING the 1981 Term the United States Supreme Court decided
two cases that relate directly to Texas law in the parent and child
area' and three others that have an indirect effect. 2 The Mills v.
ilabluetzeP decision arose out of a direct attack on the constitutionality of
the Texas statute of limitations for bringing a paternity suit. The suit at-
tacked the original, one-year limitation period4 and not the current statute,
which provides for a four-year period. 5 A unanimous Court had no dif-
ficulty finding that one year is an "unrealistically short time limitation
[and] is not substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the pros-
ecution of stale or fraudulent claims."' 6 The Court concluded that the
Texas statute denied illegitimate children the equal protection of the law.7
At the time the Supreme Court decided Mills a similar case was pending
before the Texas Supreme Court in which a court of civil appeals had
found the same statute unconstitutional based on due process grounds. 8
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, but
based its holding on equal protection in accordance with the Mills
opinion.9
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Texas Supreme Court
expressed an opinion as to the constitutionality of the new four-year stat-
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
1. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S.
Ct. 1549, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982).
2. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 102 S. Ct. 323 i, 73 L. Ed.
2d 928 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982); Santosky
v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
3. 102 S. Ct. 1549, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982).
4. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 13, § 13.01, at 1261-62.
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 1555, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 779. The unanimous opinion was achieved by
virtue of the concurrence of five Justices speaking through Justice O'Connor. Id. at 1556-58,
71 L. Ed. 2d at 779-82.
7. Id. at 1556, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 779; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
8. In re Miller, 605 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), a f'd sub nom. In
re J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
9. 631 S.W.2d at 732.
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ute of limitations, although both courts stated that they were aware of the
change in Texas law.' 0 Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court,
stated that the holding that "Texas must provide illegitimate children with
a bona fide opportunity to obtain paternal support does not mean. . . that
it must adopt procedures for illegitimate children that are coterminous
with those accorded legitimate children."' "I Thus the Court left open the
question of what is a constitutionally mandated length of time for illegiti-
mate children to determine their paternity. Justice O'Connor, together
with four other Justices, noted that the decision might be interpreted as
approving the current Texas four-year statute of limitations. 12 In her con-
currence, after discussing various fact situations that might require a
longer period than one year for establishing paternity, Justice O'Connor
stated that she did not read the Court's decision as prejudging the constitu-
tionality of periods longer than the one-year limitation.' 3 Justice Powell
went even further; he agreed with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the
decision, but emphasized the fact "that a paternity suit is one of the few
Texas causes of action not tolled during the minority of the plaintiff.' 4
Considering the complaints from the Justices concerning the overcrowd-
ing of their dockets, the Mils decision is most irresponsible.' 5 Since Texas
is not the only state with a limitation period shorter than the age of minor-
ity in paternity suits,' 6 the Court will have the same question before it
again very soon. In fact, the court has already noted probable jurisdiction
in a case concerning a Tennessee statute.17 That case is just one of a
number of contradictory state court decisions based on Mills.' 8 It would
seem that the Texas Supreme Court should also have considered the new
four-year statute since the amount of litigation on the subject in Texas
indicates that it is an important issue. Furthermore, by not addressing the
new statute the court may further delay certainty in this area. The com-
mon law now controls the limitation period for all children born prior to
the enactment of the new statute.' 9 An even longer period of confusion
10. 102 S. Ct. at 1552 n.1, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 775 n.1; 631 S.W.2d at 732.
11. Id. at 1553, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 777.
12. Id. at 1556, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 780.
13. Id. at 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 782.
14. Id., 71 L. Ed. 2d at 782 (quoting Justice O'Connor's opinion, 102 S. Ct. at 1557, 71
L. Ed. 2d at 781).
15. See PowellAre the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A.J. 1370, 1372
(1982).
16. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-6 (Burns 1980) (two-year limitation); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 517(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1981) (two-year limitation, or two years after
the mother becomes 18); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 7, 9A U.L.A. 596 (1979) (suggests either a
three-year limitation, or three years after child reaches the age of majority).
17. Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn. 1982) (upholding the Tennessee two-year
statute of limitations, prob. Juris noted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982).
18. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradley, 8 FAM. LAW REP. (BNA) 2696 (Ore. Aug. 25, 1982)
(holding a six-year statute of limitations unconstitutional); Astemborskii v. Susmarki, 9
FAM. LAW. REP. (BNA) 2104 (Pa. Nov. 4, 1982) (holding a six-year statute constitutional).
19. See In re Renteria, 624 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ),
relying on Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), in applying not only the general four-year statute of limita-
tions, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958), but also the statutory tolling
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will occur if the new statute is found unconstitutional. 20 Let us hope that
either the courts or the legislature will shortly resolve the question.
The second decision that directly concerned Texas law was Plyler v.
Doe.2' A five Justice majority held that Texas could not treat undocu-
mented aliens as nonpersons who are outside the jurisdiction or responsi-
bility of Texas, and thus undeserving of equal protection.22 The Court
found that the complete denial of a free public education to undocumented
alien children would create a permanent subclass of illiterates, and such a
denial must be justified by a substantial state interest. 23 The Court found
no such interest. While not deviating from its view that public education is
not a fundamental right, 24 the Court found that the cost to Texas of pro-
viding these children with a free education was not burdensome enough to
form a reasonable basis for denying them an education. 25 Because of this
decision the legislature should amend the Texas Education Code26 to pro-
vide reimbursement from the Available School Fund to the school districts
throughout the state for the cost of educating these children.
Board of Education v. Rowley 27 delineates the standard for providing
personalized instruction to handicapped children. The Court interpreted
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197528 to mean that a
state has provided a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public
education" if its services allow the child to "benefit educationally. '29 The
five-Justice majority found that it was not necessary to "maximize the po-
tential of each handicapped child." 30 The Court also cautioned lower
courts "to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods"
when interpreting the Act.3 '
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency 32 the Court
provision for persons under disability, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon 1958 &
Supp. 1982-1983).
20. One authority says: "It seems highly likely that any statute of limitation on pater-
nity suits other than eighteen years will be found to be unconstitutional by some future,
authoritative decision." Sampson, Texas Family Code Symposium- Determination of Pater-
nity, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 897, 903 (1982). But see Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369
(Tenn. 1982) (two-year statute constitutional), prob juris noted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1982).
21. 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1982).
22. Id. at 2391, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 795.
23. 1d. at 2402, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 803.
24. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
25. 102 S. Ct. at 2401-02, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 807-08.
26. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1982-1983).
27. 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. 102 S. Ct. at 3049, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 710.
30. Id. at 3048, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 708.
31. Id. at 3051, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 712. The most recent Texas case interpreting the Act
involves damages for failing to provide appropriate services rather than standards. In Ruth
Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982), the court held that,
if a school district fails to provide appropriate education for a handicapped child, and uni-
lateral arrangements are made to overcome the school district's failure, there might be a
limited reimbursement remedy in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 468-69.
32. 102 S. Ct. 3231, 73 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1982).
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refused to extend federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to child custody
cases. 33 The Court held that it would not permit a collateral challenge to a
state court's involuntary termination of parental rights by means of a writ
of habeas corpus, even though the writ alleged that the underlying state
statute is unconstitutional. 34 The Court based its decision on two impor-
tant factors. First, the state has a strong interest in finality of child-custody
disputes because of the child's need for certainty.35 Secondly, although
habeas corpus historically has been used to settle child custody suits, these
cases have arisen within particular jurisdictional systems, not between
them.36 This type of federal interference with state judicial systems is not
justified since the federal government has no substantive interest in child
custody matters, and would unnecessarily undermine the principle of fed-
eralism.37 The decision is significant in that it may prevent expansion of
federal court involvement in domestic relations matter.38
The last case concerning the parent-child relationship that the Supreme
Court decided during its 1981 Term does not change Texas law. In
Santosky v. Kramer39 the Court held that when a state seeks to sever the
parent-child relationship permanently, it can do so only if the evidence is
clear and convincing.40 In 1980 the Texas Supreme Court established the
same rule in In re G.M 41 Although the holding of Santosky is not signifi-
cant for Texans, its reasoning is important because it attempts to explain
and evaluate the factors a court must consider to provide due process in
cases where the state and the parents, or the child, are antagonists. The
test in these cases is the one promulgated in Mathews v. Eldridge.42 The
tribunal should balance the importance of the parent's or child's interest,
the risk of error in depriving him of that interest, and the governmental
interest in not raising the costs of its procedures in order to further mini-
mize the possibility of error.43
II. STATUS
Texas now must provide tuition-free education to undocumented illegal
alien children,44 but individual Texas school districts may still exercise
some control over who receives a free education within their particular
district. The Texas Education Code establishes the requirements for ad-
33. Id. at 3238, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 940. The writ was applied for under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
34. 102 S. Ct. at 3238, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 937.
35. Id. at 3238-39, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 938.
36. Id. at 3239, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 939.
37. Id. at 3239-40, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 939-40.
38. See Sheres v. Englman, 534 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (discussed infra notes
202-08 and accompanying text).
39. 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
40. Id. at 1402-03, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615-16.
41. 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980).
42. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
43. Id. at 335.
44. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982); see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
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mission to schools in Texas, and the various boards of trustees have the
power to implement these requirements in accordance with an overall pol-
icy that favors a tuition-free education for all Texas children. 4 The mere
presence of a child in a particular district, however, does not necessarily
entitle him to a tuition-free education in that district. For example, a dis-
trict may require a child to reside with a parent or guardian in the district
before that child may obtain a free education. 46 In Jackson v. Waco In-
dependent School District47 the court not only found sound policy reasons
for this residence rule48 but also reasoned that because a court desegrega-
tion order had previously established attendance zones, this rule was
necessary. 49
Once the right of attendance has been established, problems may remain
concerning eligibility to participate in interscholastic athletics. The Uni-
versity Interscholastic League's (UIL) summer camp rule5° withstood a
constitutional attack in Kite v. Marshall.5' The court held that a minimum
rationality test applies to this type of classification and found no equal
protection violation.52 In addition, the court found that the rule is not
wholly arbitrary and, therefore, does not offend the due process clause.53
This victory for the UIL in federal court may be a hollow one, however,
since a Texas trial court granted a permanent injunction against enforce-
ment of the rule, and the appellate court dismissed the case on the basis of
nonjurisdiction. 54 The appellate court held in this and in another appeal
from a UIL injunction that it could not have jurisdiction unless the UIL
posted an appeal bond, which it failed to do.55 The UIL is not a public
entity and, therefore, is not excused from filing appeal bonds.56
45. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.26(b) (Vernon 1972) ("The trustees shall have the
exclusive power to manage and govern the public free schools .... "); id. § 21.031(c)
(Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982-1983) ("The board of trustees ... shall admit into the public
free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are. . . over five and not over 21
years of age . . . if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control
resides within the school district.").
46. Arredondo v. Brackette, 648 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming the constitutionality
of the statute in relation to native born American children whose Mexican parents are not in
the United States), cert. grantedsub nom. Martinez v. Brackette, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998.01 (U.S.
June 22, 1982); DeLeon v. Harlingen Consol. Indep. School Dist., 552 S.W.2d 922, 924-25
(Tex. Civ. app.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
47. 629 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 205.
49. Id.; see also Arvizu v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex.
1973).
50. The summer camp rule prohibits a student from participating in interscholastic ath-
letic competitions for a year following the student's attendance at a specialized athletic train-
ing camp. See Marshall v. Brown, 635 S.W.2d 578, 579 n.l (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982,
writ refd n.r.e.).
51. 661 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2934, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1333 (1982).
52. 661 F.2d at 1030.
53. Id.
54. Marshall v. Brown, 635 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
55. Id. at 580; see also University Interscholastic League v. Payne, 635 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd) (UIL must file bond).
56. 635 S.W.2d at 580.
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In Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District7 the court per
curiam withdrew a previous opinion58 and held that the use of trained
dogs in dragnet sniff-searches of children in school is unconstitutional,59
but the use of these dogs to detect contraband in students' cars and lockers
is not.60 The court found that a dog's generalized exploratory sniffing of
persons is an unreasonable search when no individualized suspicion exists
and, thus, violates the fourth amendment. 61 The court held, however, that
using these dogs to detect contraband in students' cars and lockers is not
an unreasonable, unconstitutional search if the dogs are reliable.62 This is
a modification of the holding in Jones v. Latexo Independent School Dis-
trict63 that enjoined all such searches.64
A child's name is important in determining his status and normally the
last name is the name in controversy between the parents. The courts have
supported fathers when mothers have attempted to change the surnames of
their children without using legal steps. 65 In re M.L.P 66 did not involve
the surname, but rather the first and middle names of the child. The child
was born prior to the parents' divorce hearing, and the mother named the
child without consulting the father. The father challenged the child's
name at the time of the divorce, but the trial court refused to change it.67
The appellate court also refused, holding that, while the court should make
a name change at the father's request whenever there is evidence that a
change is in the best interest of the child, there was no such evidence in this
case.
68
The status of a child directly controls the right to intestate inheritance
from parents.69 Intestate succession is governed by the Probate Code,70
but identity may be a factual issue. Such was the case in Joplin v. Mead-
ows 7 1 in which the cousins of the deceased attempted to establish them-
selves as the rightful heirs by showing that an alleged nephew was not, in
fact, the nephew of the deceased. The nephew's father was the brother of
the deceased and had predeceased her. The nephew was born during the
second year of the brother's prior marriage. After eight years the marriage
of the deceased's brother ended in divorce and the divorce petition alleged
that the couple had separated on the day after the marriage. The cousins
57. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
58. 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982).
59. 690 F.2d at 481-84.
60. Id. at 488.
61. Id. at 481-82.
62. Id. at 486 n.40.
63. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
64. d. at 236-37.
65. See Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw.
L.J. 155, 162-63 (1982).
66. 621 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
67. Id. (mother named child Marcus Lee while father favored Shawn Christian).
68. d. at 431.
69. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980).
70. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 37-43 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1982-1983).
71. 623 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
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argued that the petition, which raised questions of access, was evidence
that the nephew was not the deceased brother's legitimate son. The court
found, however, that the son was born during the term of the brother's first
marriage and thus was presumed to be his legitimate child.72 This pre-
sumption is one of the strongest known in the law, and only clear and
convincing evidence will rebut it.73 The only evidence the court would
accept to rebut the presumption was proof of nonaccess or impotence of
the alleged father.74 Affirming the trial court's finding that the nephew
was the deceased's heir, the court held that the allegations of abandonment
recited in the divorce petition and decree were merely hearsay and of no
probative value. 75
In some situations the child's identity is established, but not his legiti-
macy. In Batchelor v. Batchelor76 two alleged illegitimate sons of the intes-
tate intervened in an application to declare heirship. The two alleged sons
claimed a right to inherit because the decedent had recognized them as his
children. The claimants agreed that their father had not followed the Pro-
bate Code procedures that would have made them legitimate heirs,77 but
they relied on Johnson v. Marical78 to argue that this was not necessary.
The Fort Worth appeals court distinguished Johnson in that it involved a
will contest rather than intestate succession. 79 The court followed Bell v.
Hinkle80 instead, which held that an illegitimate child may inherit from
his father only if the Probate Code requirements are met.81
Texas recognizes the concept of adoption by estoppel. 82 Thus, with
proper proof a person not formally adopted by the deceased may, never-
theless, inherit as the legitimate child of the deceased. Pouncy v. Garner83
limited the right of equitably adopted children to a right to inherit only
from their adoptive parents and their privies, excluding ancillary relatives.
This distinction does not appear to comport with the Probate Code defini-
tion of child, which specifically includes those adopted by estoppel.84 The
Probate Code provides that an adopted child inherits from and through his
72. Id. at 443-44; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-
1983).
73. 623 S.W.2d at 444.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 634 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980).
78. 620 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam,
626 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3496, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1375 (1982). In denying the
writ of error the Texas Supreme Court stated: "The question of whether an illegitimate
child may be recognized in any manner other than that provided in section 42 of the Texas
Probate Code is not properly presented for our review. We therefore express no opinion on
the writing of the court of appeals on this question." 626 S.W.2d at 738.
79. 634 S.W.2d at 73.
80. 607 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ reed n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1982).
81. 607 S.W.2d at 937.
82. See Cubley v. Barbee, 123 Tex. 411, 73 S.W.2d 72 (1934).
83. 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(b) (Vernon 1980).
1983]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
adoptive parents and their kin as if the child was the natural, legitimate
child of the adoptive parents. 85 For inheritance purposes, therefore, adop-
tion by estoppel should place the child in the same position as all other
legitimate children. Proof of an equitable adoption is at best difficult, and
evidence of an agreement to adopt must exist. A mere intention is not
sufficient.86
Conlon v. Schweiker87 is an interesting case because it held that the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, when deciding who is entitled to
survivor's benefits under social security, is not bound by a state court's
decree if the court did not have personal jurisdiction over all the parties. 88
In Conlon a child claimed survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act
through her alleged father. The child's mother had obtained an ex parte
divorce based on an alleged common law marriage, and the Texas divorce
court had found that the child was born of the marriage. In making his
ruling the Secretary ignored this finding. The court sustained the Secre-
tary and held he was not bound by the Texas decree and could determine,
from all the facts, the child's right to benefits. 89 The court agreed that the
facts were not sufficient to establish a common law marriage. 90 The child,
therefore, was illegitimate and was not entitled to receive the social secur-
ity benefits.91
Paternity suits in Texas are dismissed with prejudice if blood tests ex-
clude the putative father from the possibility of actual fatherhood.92 The
possibility exists that a man not excluded by the blood tests is not the fa-
ther, and if he is able to convince the trier of fact, then the court will find
that he is not the parent of the child, perhaps causing some other male to
undergo the same procedure.93 For example, in In re J TH ,94 after the
blood test but before the trial, the putative father agreed to admit father-
hood in exchange for a waiver of compensation or support of the child.
The trial court did not admit this agreement into evidence since the court
considered it an offer to compromise and not a completed compromise
agreement. The jury found that the putative father was not the parent.
The appellate court sustained the trial court and agreed with its interpreta-
tion of the law pertaining to admission of offers of settlement.95 The court
pointed out that the offer could not have ripened into a settlement because
the child was not represented by a guardian ad litem, and, thus, the settle-
85. Id. § 40.
86. Id.; see King v. Heirs and Beneficiaries of Watkins, 624 S.W.2d 252, 255, 257 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
87. 537 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
88. Id. at 163.
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 165.
92. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
93. Lopez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 631 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ), is a more typical paternity case in which the jury despite some eviden-
tiary flaws found the putative father to be the parent.
94. 630 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
95. Id. at 477.
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ment would have been in violation of the Family Code.96
In In re MG. 97 another putative father, who was found to be a parent
after trial, appealed the decision on the grounds that he had been denied
due process because the paternity proceedings would not have been initi-
ated if the mother of the child had not applied for aid from the Depart-
ment of Human Resources. He alleged that he should have been notified
of her application so that he could contest her need for financial assistance.
The court, while agreeing that the Department of Human Resources insti-
tuted a paternity proceeding as a direct result of providing financial assist-
ance to the mother, nonetheless held that the application for assistance in
itself was not the cause of the paternity proceeding.98 Hearings by the
Department of Human Resources are merely to determine the applicants'
eligibility for benefits and relate to their own financial needs, not the activ-
ities of third parties. 99 It is true, of course, that the Department of Human
Resources initiates paternity proceedings in order to be reimbursed for its
expenditures in behalf of a child it has found to be in need, and this is
what happened in this case.' °° In In re JA.K '0' the mother appealed
from a paternity suit, and the appellate court reversed and remanded be-
cause the trial court had used clear and convincing evidence as the stan-
dard of proof instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 0 2 The
court pointed out that in Texas a paternity proceeding is a civil action and
involves no criminal sanctions.' 0 3 The standard pertaining to the pretrial
conference, which can result in dismissal, is clear and convincing,' °4 but
the court concluded that the pre-trial situation is different since its purpose
is to dismiss frivolous claims.'0 5 Thus, the policy is that claims about
which there is the slightest doubt should go to trial, so that the merits can
be determined by a preponderance of the evidence.
III. CONSERVATORSHIP
Under Texas law a parent has the right to physical possession of his
child unless there has been some judicial ruling to the contrary.'0 6 Ac-
cordingly, mere possession of a child for a period of time will not ripen
into a right superior to that of the parents, and a court faced with such a
fact situation should automatically issue a writ of habeas corpus in favor of
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.07 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides that "[tihe child
must be a party to a settlement agreement with the alleged father ... [and] shall be repre-
sented in the settlement agreement by a guardian ad litem."
97. 625 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. Id. at 749.
99. Id.
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides that "no al-
leged father denying paternity may be required to make any payment for the support of the
child until paternity is established."
101. 624 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. Id. at 357.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
105. 624 S.W.2d at 357.
106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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the parent. 107 A parent's right of possession prevails in spite of a guardi-
anship order, since such orders cannot terminate the parent-child relation-
ship. 108 This same rule applies to disputes between parents, one of whom
has been given custody by a proper court order.'0 9 The court should not,
however, relitigate custody orders in a habeas corpus hearing. 10
Once a trial court establishes custody, third parties may not intervene by
moving for a new trial."'l While the best interests of the child are always
paramount and should not be subverted by procedural rules," 2 a court
will consider an intervenor's plea only if he produces evidence that had not
been available to the court in its original hearing. 1 3 In Gillespie v. Gilles-
pie114 an appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision
to name the father managing conservator in a child custody case." 15 The
appeals court based its decision on the trial court's improper introduction
of hospital records that showed the mother had received treatment for al-
coholism."16 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reinstated the trial
court's decision, holding that trial courts have wide latitude in custody
cases and that sufficient evidence existed without the hospital records to
support the trial court's finding.' "7 The court specifically did not reach the
question of the introduction of hospital records. Trial courts must, how-
ever, follow proper procedure. The Tyler appeals court in Hawkins v.
Hawkins'18 granted a new trial in a divorce and custody suit because the
divorce court failed to make a record of the trial.' 19 The Tyler court found
that, although the father waived service and notice of the trial, he did not
waive the record.120 He was entitled to a statement of facts, the court rea-
soned, to preserve his right to an appellate review. 2' Moreover, an ap-
peals court will reverse a trial court's custody determination unless the trial
court shows that it had jurisdiction over the parties. The mere recital of
jurisdiction over a nonresident party will not provide jurisdiction to a
107. See Trevino v. Garcia, 627 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. 1982). The court granted the
parents a mandamus to overturn a writ of habeas corpus granted by the district court to the
child's aunt and uncle. The aunt and uncle claimed a right of possession based on the
doctrine of adoption by estoppel, having had physical possession of the child for over six
years.
108. Armstrong v. Reiter, 628 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex. 1982): "[T]he county court lacks
jurisdiction to enter any order which would affect the parent-child relationship."
109. Perry v. Scoggins, 626 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1981).
110. Id. at 303.
111. Gaines v. Baldwin, 629 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
112. C - v. C -, 534 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ dism'd).
113. Gaines v. Baldwin, 629 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
114. 631 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982), rev'd, 644 S.W.2d 449 (Tex.
1982).
115. 631 S.W.2d at 593.
116. Id. at 592-93.
117. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 84. The supreme court specifically did not reach the question
of admissibility of hospital records.
118. 626 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
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court to decide custody. 122 Some facts as to the nonresident's minimum
contacts with Texas must be shown. 23
Enforcement of court orders can be a problem and courts often use con-
tempt to force compliance.' 24 Civil contempt is frequently used to enforce
support orders when the individual has the money to pay but willfully
refuses. ' 25 The attorneys' fees and costs that are engendered by the attempt
to collect support are considered a part of the underlying obligation and
may be collected through the same contempt procedure as is used to en-
force the support obligation.' 26 Attorneys' fees for enforcement of a con-
servatorship order, however, are debts for legal services, and thus are not
enforceable by contempt.' 27 In addition to holding that conservatorship
orders cannot be enforced by contempt, one justice in Exparte Rogers held
that a sheriff could reduce a criminal contempt sentence by good time
credit.' 28 In that case a mother failed to return her minor children for four
years after the end of the visitation period. In addition to a civil contempt
order, the trial court sentenced her to thirty days in jail for criminal con-
tempt.' 29 The sheriff allowed her to complete her time in less than thirty
days by applying a good time credit to her sentence. 3 0 The appellate
court analogized criminal contempt to misdemeanor sentences and held
that the credit could be used to reduce her sentence.' 3 ' The concurring
justices modified this statement by holding that this credit could be used
only if the court issuing the criminal contempt order had not prohibited
it.132 The dissent would not allow the credit in any circumstances, reason-
ing that the power to modify a contempt sentence rests with the rendering
Court. 1
3 3
The doctrine of continuing jurisdiction obtains in child custody mat-
ters. 34 A court will modify a conservatorship order when there has been a
change in the circumstances of the managing conservator that is injurious
to the child so that a change in conservator would be a positive improve-
122. Eby v. Leenerts, 623 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
123. Id. at 502; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
124. The kidnapping, retention, and hiding of children is a continuing problem. The
federal courts have begun allowing tort actions based on these activities. See Bennett v.
Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1982). Congress, in addition to enacting the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-69, (codified as amended in scattered sections at 28
U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C.), has recently passed the Missing Children Act, Pub. L. No. 97-292, 96
Stat. 1259 (1982), which is intended to help in the positive identification of missing children.
125. See Exparle Alderson, 623 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
126. Exparle Helms, 152 Tex. 480, 259 S.W.2d 184 (1953).
127. Exparle Rogers, 633 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
128. Id. at 668-69.
129. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1911a (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1982).
130. Texas law allows the sheriff to deduct time from convicts' prison terms for good
conduct, industry, and obedience. Id. art. 5118a.
131. 633 S.W.2d at 669.
132. Id. at 672.
133. Id. at 674.
134. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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ment for the child.135 A jury must base its decision on evidence substanti-
ating this change of circumstance. 36 Regardless of any evidence, a court
will order a new trial if the respondent was not properly notified of the
modification hearing. 137 The court, at both the trial and appellate level,
keeps the child's interest paramount. For example, when a trial court has
found that no change should be ordered, the appellate court can rectify
procedural errors by reversing and remanding without changing the child's
situation unnecessarily. 138 Furthermore, if a trial court decides to change
the managing conservator, it can suspend the judgment pending appeal. 139
Thus, if the appellate court reverses, the trial court's decision will not have
changed the child's situation unnecessarily. This is a discretionary power,
and an appellate court will not intervene unless there has been a clear
abuse. 140
The exercise of continuing jurisdiction over a mobile population can be-
come quite complicated. When the child's residence changes from one
county to another within Texas the Family Code provides for a transfer of
jurisdiction. ' 4' If all the provisions of the statute have been satisfied, this
transfer is mandatory. 42 The process works smoothly within Texas, but
problems arise when the moves are between Texas and another state. 43 In
Medellin v. Dillon 1'4 a mother whom a Texas Court had named managing
conservator moved with the child to Louisiana. When the child, two and a
half years later, visited Texas the father filed a motion to modify asking
that he be named managing conservator. The mother was personally
served in Louisiana and filed a special appearance to protest the Texas
court's jurisdiction on the grounds that she and the child had been perma-
nently out of the state for more than six months. 45 Prior to the hearing on
the special appearance motion, the father changed the basis of his lawsuit
135. Jones v. Cable, 626 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1981); Gary v. Gary, 631 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Ct.
App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hogge v. Kimbrow, 631 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Beaumont 1982, no writ); In re T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d 441 ('rex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, writ dism'd); Gaona v. Gaona, 627 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no
writ); Horton v. Horton, 625 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.);
Queton v. Queton, 622 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
136. Fambro v. Fambro, 635 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
137. Weibusch v. Weibusch, 636 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no
writ); Vick v. Vick, 626 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
138. McPherson v. McPherson, 626 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no
writ) (trial court failed to make available to the parties social studies that court had consid-
ered); In re Brazil, 621 S.W.2d 811 ('rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ) (father, mo-
vant, failed to appear at hearing; trial court should have dismissed for want of prosecution).
139. McGee v. McGee, 634 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
140. Id. at 782.
141. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
142. Arias v. Spector, 623 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1981).
143. See Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law Litigation, 36
Sw. L.J. 1085 (1983); Weintraub, Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship Without Jurisdiction
Over Both Parents, 36 Sw. L.J. 1167 (1983).
144. 627 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981), writ rejd ntr.e., per
curiam, 633 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1982).
145. TEX. FAM. CODE AN. § 11.052(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides that with-
out written consent of both parties, a court cannot exercise continuing jurisdiction to modify
the "appointment of a managing conservator if the managing conservator and the child have
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from a motion to modify to a claim that it would be in the best interest of
the child for the court to take jurisdiction because there was a serious ques-
tion concerning the child's welfare. This plea changed the case from one
asserting continuous jurisdiction to one asserting original jurisdiction. 146
The trial court denied the mother's challenge to the jurisdiction and
named the father temporary managing conservator.
The mother, meanwhile, petitioned the Louisiana court to enforce the
original 1977 Texas custody judgment. The court dismissed the case on
the father's exception to the Louisiana court's jurisdiction. An intermedi-
ate Louisiana appellate court sustained this decision.147 Shortly thereafter,
the Texas appellate court reversed the Texas district court on the basis
that, while it had proper subject matter jurisdiction, it did not have in per-
sonam jurisdiction. The appeals court held that the mother and child had
been absent from the state for so long that it would be a violation of due
process for the Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction.148 The Texas
Supreme Court denied the writ and affirmed the appellate court, but noted
that it did so on the basis that Louisiana was the more appropriate fo-
rum. 149 The court specifically did not express an opinion on the due pro-
cess question.' 50
The Texas Supreme Court also noted that, prior to its decision, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court had reversed and remanded the decisions of the
lower Louisiana courts.15' The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Loui-
siana had jurisdiction based on the definition of home state found in the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which Louisiana had
adopted. 52 The Louisiana court also found it to be in the best interest of
the child to assume jurisdiction because of the child's significant connec-
tions with Louisiana and the presence in the state of substantial evidence
concerning the child's welfare. 53 Additionally, the Louisiana court
pointed out that Texas has not enacted the UCCJA and while the Family
Code's provisions are similar, they are not the same and, therefore, need
not be given the same deference.' 54 Medellin significantly illustrates the
problems caused by Texas being the only state that has neither enacted nor
judicially recognized the UCCJA.' 55
established and continued to maintain their principal residence in another state for more
than six months."
146. Id. § 11.045(a)(2).
147. 402 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1981), rev'd, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982).
148. 627 S.W.2d at 741.
149. 633 S.W.2d at 787.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 409 So. 2d at 574-75; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1705(A) (West Supp. 1983).
153. 409 So. 2d at 575; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1702(A)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
154. 409 So. 2d at 576.
155. The 68th Texas Legislature will probably rectify this by adopting the UCCJA and
modifying the relevant Family Code Sections.
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IV. SUPPORT
In Ridgway v. Ridgway'56 the United States Supreme Court limited a
divorce court's jurisdiction over insurance policies issued under the Ser-
viceman's Group Life Insurance Act.' 57 Congress modified this decision
by amending the survivor benefit plans through the Department of De-
fense Authorization Act of 1983.158 In planning to use such an annuity to
ensure support for a child, a parent must carefully follow the provisions of
the Act, which can require the service person to get the former spouse's
approval before changing the beneficiary.' 59 Even if the obligor spouse is
unwilling to agree to such a plan, the Act provides for notice to the former
spouse should the obligor spouse attempt to make such a change. 60
Texas courts may order either lump sum or periodic child support pay-
ments.' 6' Both parents have a duty to support their children and the
courts may order both to pay.162 Neither disparity of income 63 nor total
disability'" will necessarily relieve a spouse of this duty. The court, how-
ever, must base its decree on evidence, and the obligor's ability to pay is a
necessary part of that evidence. 65
In order for a court to modify a support decree, it must, of course, have
jurisdiction over the parties, and the presence of the children and one par-
ent will not necessarily give the court jurisdiction over a nonresident
party.166 Valid jurisdiction, however, does not mean that a court can base
a modification on no facts. In Staff v. Staff' 67 a Texas court had entered
the original decree and in a later suit modified the child support order.
The father appealed the modification. The father entered a special ap-
pearance to contest the court's jurisdiction in the modification suit and
provided no evidence as to his ability to pay child support. Although a
statement of facts was not in the record, the appellate court presumed there
156. 454 U.S. 46, 102 S. Ct. 49 (1981); see also Solender, supra note 65, at 159.
157. 38 U.S.C. § 365-700 (1980).
158. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (1982).
159. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1450 (1976) (pre-amendment code provision allowing service
person to designate beneficiaries).
160. Id. § 1450.
161. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
162. Id. § 4. A duty of support exists only if there is a parent-child relationship. See also
Linan v. Linan, 632 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (motion to
terminate own parent-child relationship denied).
163. Hourigan v. Hourigan, 635 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ)
(former wife ordered to pay lump sum from her share of community assets as child support).
164. Mendoza v. Mendoza, 621 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ). The original decree recited that the disabled spouse/father had no obligation to sup-
port. Before final judgment on the original decree, the mother filed a motion to modify, and
after a hearing, the father was ordered to pay $200 a month support. Id.
165. In re E.L.P., 636 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ). In
addition, the two concurring justices, who were the majority on this point, held that the
grandparents' claim for reimbursement for necessaries for the child may, on proper plead-
ings, be considered in the suit. Id. at 583.
166. Ford v. Durham, 624 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ dism'd)
(original divorce decree was in New Mexico, and appellee's visits to Texas to see child held
not sufficient for jurisdiction).
167. 623 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ dism'd).
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were enough facts to support the trial court's jurisdiction, but the Fort
Worth court reversed on the child support issue. 68 The modification judg-
ment recited that there was no evidence on the father's financial situation
except that he had a college education and had worked in the aerospace
industry. The court found this to be insufficient evidence to support an
upward modification of the child support payments. 69
Evidence of the obligor's change of circumstances is sufficient to in-
crease or decrease support payments.170 The amount of the modification is
within the trial court's discretion, and an appeals court will not overturn it
without evidence of abuse.' 7 ' The trial court may also condition sus-
pending the order of downward modification on whether or not it is ap-
pealed.' 72 In many cases both the needs of the children and the earnings
of the obligor have increased. 173 The obligor's increase in earnings need
not be in the form of a cash salary. For example, although the former
spouse did not receive a salary, the appeals court allowed a modification
order based on the value of the work she performed because it contributed
to her community estate.' 74
A consent judgment does not bar an increase in support when the origi-
nal judgment indicates that the parties intended the agreement to survive
the decree as an enforceable contract as well as a judgment. 75 The law
pertaining to modifications of contractual child support agreements has
not been clearly established. Although the lower courts have addressed
the issue,' 76 the Texas Supreme Court has not.
Edwards v. Edwards177 involved a tangle of collateral and direct attacks
upon various child support modification judgments. In 1977, on a motion
to modify, the trial court entered a default judgment relieving a father
from support obligations that had accrued prior to the motion to modify.
The judgment also decreased future support obligations for a period, after
which the obligations increased for their duration. The mother did not
168. Id. at 153.
169. Id.
170. Bible v. Bible, 631 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)
(payments decreased from $640 to $540 per month); Williamson v. Williamson, 624 S.W.2d
633 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1981, no writ) (support increased from $150 to
$500 per month).
171. Bible v. Bible, 631 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
172. Id. at 179.
173. See Broday v. Burleson, 632 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ) (support increased from $215 to $375 per month); Smallwood v. Smallwood, 625
S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (support increased from $300 to
$500 per month); Carpenter v. White, 624 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ) (support increased from $325 to $475 per month).
174. Phelan v. Taylor, 627 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ)(the former spouse performed secretarial duties for her lawyer/husband).
175. Dorshaw v. Dorshaw, 635 S.W.2d 783,784-85 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
no writ).
176. See Dorshaw v. Dorshaw, 635 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, n6
writ); Duke v. Duke, 448 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, no writ) (child sup-
port provisions incorporated into divorce decree subject to modification).
177. 624 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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appeal from this judgment. The father/obligor failed to comply with the
modified decree, and the mother filed a motion to reduce the unpaid child
support to judgment. The trial court, in determining the amount of the
judgment, omitted from its calculations the arrearage that the court on the
previous motion had forgiven and, also, the later increases in support. The
appeals court found that the original modification order that forgave the
arrearages was void. The arrearages had accrued prior to the filing of the
motion to modify and were, therefore, final. Thus, the court reasoned, the
first modifying trial court did not have the power to forgive those pay-
ments.'78 Furthermore, the court held that the second modifying trial
court, in reducing the father's obligation to judgment, had miscalculated
the later payments. 79 The court distinguished modification proceedings
from contempt proceedings, indicating that in the former courts may not
modify retroactively, whereas in the latter they may.' 80 It would seem that
the better view is that courts cannot modify arrearages in any proceeding,
but can suspend the payment of portions of the arrearages for a period of
time in order to have the obligor avoid contempt.181
In Nagle v. Nagle i8 2 a mother orally agreed to waive one of several past
due child support payments. In exchange, the father agreed to pay the past
due payments and convey his one-half interest in their home. The father
paid the arrearages as well as the payment the mother had waived, but
refused to convey his interest in their house. The mother sued for specific
performance of the oral contract, or in the alternative, for damages based
on fraud. The jury found fraud on the part of the father, and awarded the
mother an amount equal to the father's interest in the house plus the court
costs. The appeals court affirmed this decision.' 8 3 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the intermediate court on the basis that the agreement vio-
lated the statute of frauds.' 8 4 The supreme court also rejected the mother's
argument that the court should uphold the agreement as an enforceable
compromise and settlement, reasoning that, in order to apply this theory, a
valid dispute must exist.' 85 In this case the parties agreed that back child
support was owing; therefore no evidence of a dispute existed.'
8 6
Huff v. Huff' 87 provides the Texas Supreme Court with an opportunity
178. Id. at 638-39; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983); Casterline v. Burden, 560 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
179. 624 S.W.2d at 638-39.
180. Id.; see Whitley v. Whitley, 566 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no
writ).
181. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975).
182. 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982).
183. Nagle v. Nagle, 617 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981), rev'd
inpart, 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982).
184. 633 S.W.2d at 801.
185. Id. The court quoted from Gilliam v. Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 271, 6 S.W. 757, 759
(1887): " "lf a doubt or dispute exists between parties with respect to their rights, . . . a
compromise into which they have voluntarily entered must stand .... . 633 S.W.2d at
801 (emphasis added by the Nagle court).
186. 633 S.W.2d at 801.
187. 634 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, writ granted).
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to settle the question of which statute of limitations applies in suits to en-
force child support. The Beaumont court of appeals in Huff held that the
ten-year judgments statute should govern.' 88 The court pointed out that a
conflict exists among the intermediate courts, with some favoring the four-
year limitation. 8 9 In Texas Department of Human Resources v. Allred'9"
the trial court applied a four-year statute of limitations. The appeals court
indicated that this was incorrect, but specifically did not address the issue
because the parties did not properly plead it or raise it as an error. 191
Contempt is the most common method for enforcing support payments.
The appellate courts have no jurisdiction to hear appeals from contempt
orders, 92 but they can grant writs of habeas corpus. A court may issue a
writ of habeas corpus when it finds the contempt order to be insufficiently
clear in that it combines several charges.' 93 A habeas corpus writ is also
appropriate if the lower court issued the contempt order orally' 94 or with-
out notice.' 95 The court will not grant the writ if the relator had the oppor-
tunity to defend himself at the contempt hearing and has not shown an
inability to pay. 196 In Exparte Colley 19 7 the relator complained that in the
contempt hearing he had been called to be a witness against himself.198
The appeals court found that he had merely been informed that he could
call witnesses or testify in order to explain his failure to pay child
support. 99
Texas has enacted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA), 2°° which provides a method for persons from out of state to
enforce support obligations. To enter a judgment under this Act proper
evidence to support it must exist.20' In Sheres v. Engelman2 =2 a federal
court held that while an order under URESA does not supplant the origi-
nal order, it may modify the original order.20 3 Although no Texas court
188. Id. at 6. The ten-year statute appears at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532
(Vernon 1958).
189. 634 S.W.2d at 5. The four-year statute appears at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5529 (Vernon 1958).
190. 621 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd).
191. Id. at 663.
192. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Hebert, 621 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1981, no writ).
193. See Ex parte Oebel, 635 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no
writ); Exparle Sweeney, 628 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Ex
parte Almendarez, 621 S.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
194. See Ex parte Jacobs, 636 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
195. See Exparte Pena, 636 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ).
196. Exparte Colley, 621 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
197. Id.
198. Id.; see Exparte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547-48 (rex. 1976); U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
199. 621 S.W.2d at 652. But see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(d) (Vernon 1975): "A
parent may be compelled to testify fully in regard to his ability to support the child."
200. See TEX. FAM. CODE AN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon 1975).
201. Byrd v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 625 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex. Ct. App.-San
Antonio 1981, no writ).
202. 534 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
203. Id. at 288-89.
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has addressed the issue, the court relied on the language of the statute2°4
and decisions from other states,205 and concluded that a Texas court may
modify a support order upward, but cannot decrease a support obligation
under URESA because that would eliminate the original order.2°6 The
court reasoned that URESA is a supplemental, not a supplanting, remedy.
Thus, in this case the obligor remained liable for the full amount due
under the original decision less the amount he had already paid, despite a
Texas court's subsequent reduction in the amount of the original New
York decree. 207 The court also found nothing that would prevent a federal
court from enforcing the original order if it has jurisdiction over the
parties.208
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Texas Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the volun-
tary presuit waiver of citation in cases terminating the parent-child rela-
tionship.2°9 Balancing the child's interest in security and stability against a
parent's right to change his mind, the court held that a parent may waive
citation if he has done so "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly.1
2 10
Furthermore, the court held that it is not error to fail to make a record of
the trial, reasoning that the relinquishment to a licensed agency is irrevo-
cable and therefore the agency's petition and the affidavit of relinquish-
ment attached to it are sufficient to support a judgment.21' If the petition
and affidavit are not sufficient, then it is up to the party alleging error to
show that a statement of facts is necessary. Finally, the court held that it is
not necessary to provide an attorney for the parent at the time he volunta-
rily signs the affidavit of relinquishment. 21 2 The court distinguished vol-
untary relinquishment of rights from an involuntary termination
procedure, but did not discuss the question of counsel in an involuntary
proceeding. 213 This decision sustained the practice of adoption agencies
and the Department of Human Resources that have been in effect since the
enactment of title 2 of the Family Code. 214 The importance of finality in
adoption decisions was recognized in Texas prior to the enactment of the
Family Code, and the code provisions are merely a codification of that
204. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 21.04 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
205. 534 F. Supp. at 293.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 294. Sheres v. Engleman and Wasserman v. Wasserman, 617 F.2d 832 (4th
Cir. 1982), may signal a trend toward the federal courts' increased involvement in family
law matters. But see Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231,
72 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1982) (discussed supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text).
209. Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Services, 627 S.W.2d 390, 393-94
(Tex. 1982); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
210. Id. at 393.
211. Id. at 394.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01-.19 (Vernon 1975).
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law.215
If a person is not a parent, then his parent-child relationship cannot be
terminated since he has no legally recognized relationship. A biological
father is not a parent within the contemplation of the Family Code unless
he has legitimated his child.216 The child is, however, the legitimate child
of his mother.217 To legitimate his child a father must either marry the
mother or obtain a decree of legitimation. 218 Legitimation requires the
consent of either the mother or a court, which has found legitimation to be
in the best interest of the child.219 The trial court in In re Baby Girl S, 2 2 0
terminated the parental rights of the mother and specifically found that it
was not in the best interest of the child for the father to legitimate her.221
The appellate court approved this decision following prior Texas law,
which holds that distinguishing between biological mothers and biological
fathers furthers the important state objective of protecting the interest of
children born out of wedlock.222 In Najar v. Oman223 the court, while not
stating the best interest test specifically, pointed out that it was not neces-
sary to follow all the standards of the provisions for involuntary termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship when the biological father was not a
parent.224 The biological father was serving a fifty-year prison sentence
and the mother's husband wanted to adopt the child. In Standard v. Bled-
soe 225 the biological father claimed the child was legitimate based on an
alleged common law marriage to the mother. Because the father failed to
prove this allegation, the court found that the biological father was not a
parent, terminated the mother's parental rights, and permitted third par-
ties to adopt the child.2 2 6
There is a presumption in favor of the validity of the most recent mar-
riage and children born during this marriage are, of course, legitimate. 227
A father in In re L. 228 entered into a relationship with a woman whom
he allegedly believed to be married to another man. He had two children
by this woman, but he alleged they were legally another's. The trial court
215. See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Galveston, Inc. v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 24, 337
S.W.2d II1, 114 (1960).
216. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 12.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
217. Id. § 12.01.
218. Id. §§ 12.02; 13.21. Legitimation requires the mother or the court to approve. Id.
219. Id. § 13.21(c).
220. 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. granted sub
nom., Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18,
1983).
221. 628 S.W.2d at 262-63.
222. In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1980); In re K,
535 S.W.2d 168, 169-71 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
223. 624 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2034, 72 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1982).
224. 624 S.W.2d at 387. The court also found that a biological father has no constitu-
tional right to appear and testify personally at trial. Id.
225. 633 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
226. Id. at 568.
'227. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 1975).
228. 622 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
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notified the alleged legal father of the proceedings and terminated any in-
terest he might have had in the children. The court then found that a
binding marriage existed between the parties who had actually produced
the children and held the father to be the legal parent. 229 The court found,
however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the best interest
of the children to terminate the parent-child relationship. 230 Unless there
is proof by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory basis exists for
an involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship, 231 an appel-
late court will not sustain the trial court's decision.232 A court may not
apply this standard retroactively.233 The clear and convincing standard
applies to both termination requirements: a finding of statutorily disap-
proved actions on the part of the parent, and also a finding that it is in the
best interest of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. 234
A suit for termination of the parent-child relationship is a suit affecting
the parent-child relationship, and therefore the rules of continuing juris-
diction apply. 235 If the original court in such a case has not transferred
jurisdiction, a new court is without jurisdiction;236 the appellate court also
lacks jurisdiction and may dismiss the case on its own finding.237 The
Family Code mandates the appointment of a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the child in a termination suit, unless the court finds that the child can
be adequately represented by one of the parties.238
229. Id. at 662-63; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
230. 622 S.W.2d at 663-64. The agency brought the termination suit because the father
had killed the children's mother and left the children unattended when he fled. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
231. 622 S.W.2d at 663; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(B), (C), (D) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983).
232. In re J.J., 617 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1981); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980);
McAdoo v. Spurlock, 632 S.W.2d 224, 226-27 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ); In re
T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd); see Smith v.
McLin, 632 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Flowers v. Texas
Dep't of Human Resources, 629 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ)
(trial court judgments affirmed, evidence clear and convincing).
233. Ruff v. Christian Services, 627 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no
writ).
234. Helman v. Kincy, 632 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ);
see also Chambers v. Terrell, 630 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler), writ ref'd r.e.
per curiam, 639 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1982). The court held that no evidence of the best interest
test was dispositive, and the clear and convincing holding was unnecessary. 639 S.W.2d at
452. The court stated:
The trial court, sitting without a jury, did not use a lesser standard.
We are not to be understood as approving the holding of the Court of Ap-
peals that the affidavit of relinquishment was void because the attorney who
acted as the notary . . . had a "strong financial and beneficial interest."
Among other things, no financial interest appears in the record. The point is
reserved.
Id.
235. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
236. Id. § 11.06. But see Arias v. Spector, 633 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1981) supra note 142
and accompanying text.
237. Carroll v. Couch, 624 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
238. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Arnold v. Callier,
628 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
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InArnold v. Callier239 the court reversed and remanded the case because
of the lower court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
child at a hearing when there was no independent finding that the child
was adequately represented. In Linan v. Linan,24° however, the record did
reflect that the child was adequately represented, thus, the trial court's
findings were sustained. The cases are also distinguishable in that the par-
ent-child relationship in Arnold had been ordered terminated and in Linan
it had not. Because "[t]ermination is a drastic remedy and is of such
weight and gravity," 24' it is not surprising that appellate courts are less
likely to find that the child had adequate representation without a guard-
ian ad litem in cases in which the trial court ordered termination than in
those cases in which termination was denied.2 42 Moreover, when a trial
court orders termination, the court will approve an affidavit of inability to
pay costs of appeal based on present poverty, although "past misconduct
or improvidence" caused the inability to pay.2 43
Despite an array of procedural devices, courts sometimes err in either
finalizing adoptions or terminating parent-child relationships. In In re
Baby Boy S 244 was apparently not such a case, although the Harris County
Child Welfare Unit filed a bill of review in an adoption proceeding. The
trial court denied review, and the appellate court sustained that denial be-
cause the agency did not allege or prove that the adoptive parents were
unfit or that the natural parents' rights were improperly terminated.245
Apparently, and perhaps rightly, the Welfare Unit's concern was whether
the actions of the managing conservator were proper. The appellate court
pointed out that an adoption proceeding was not the proper forum for set-
tling grievances concerning placement procedures, especially when the
child has lived with his adoptive parents for more than four years. 246
The appellate courts can reform improper judgments only if they are
appealed. The number of cases cited above that appellate courts reversed
and remanded merely on procedural grounds indicates the difficulties
Texas lawyers and judges have in following the Family Code provisions.
Few of the requirements of the Code are merely technical. An improper
decision can destroy a child's life, especially when the decision is as final as
in a termination procedure. Joiner v. Vasquez 247 gives some indication of
the magnitude of the problem. The court terminated the father's parental
rights in a proceeding for which he was given notice by publication.
Joiner, the father, was not present at the hearing. Although no evidence
was presented, the court found that termination would be in the best inter-
239. 628 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
240. 632 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
241. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).
242. 632 S.W.2d at 157.
243. See Ranier v. Brown, 623 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1981, no writ).
244. 635 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no writ).
245. Id. at 149-50.
246. Id. at 150.
247. 632 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dalas 1982, no writ).
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ests of the children.24 8 Unfortunately, when Joiner discovered what had
happened he filed a motion for bill of review instead of a motion for a new
trial.249 The court denied the bill of review because Joiner failed to estab-
lish a meritorious defense. Joiner did not appeal this denial, but filed a
second bill of review that was denied on the basis of res judicata. Without
appealing the second denial, Joiner filed a third bill of review and then
appealed its denial. The appellate court sustained the trial court, holding
that the failure to appeal the denial of the first bill of review was a bar to
further litigation.25° The court mentioned the possibility that the minor
children might have a right to attack the decree, but did not explain who
might do so on their behalf.25'
A number of principles are in conflict in Joiner v. Vasquez. One is the
importance of the finality ofjudgments252 and another is the importance of
stability to the child.253 In Joiner, however, these principles are in opposi-
tion to the principle that the courts should follow the law. The law man-
dates a genuine finding as to the best interests of the children in any suit
affecting the parent-child relationship. 254 In all this litigation the merits of
the original decision were never reached. Moreover, the original trial
court did not reach the merits because only one party was present and the
other parties were represented in a pro forma manner. Thus, in Joiner,
stability may not be in the best interests of the children. Joiner v. Vasquez
should lead us to question whether the finality of judgment principle is so
important that an illegally arrived at decision, vital to the children in-
volved, cannot be reconsidered.255
248. 632 S.W.2d at 762 (Arian, J., dissenting).
249. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329 provides that when a defendant has not appeared and service of
process was by publication the defendant may file a motion for new trial within two years
after judgment. The motion must show good cause for a new trial and must be supported by
affidavits. Joiner's petition was filed less than a year after the judgment based on citation by
publication.
250. 632 S.W.2d at 759.
251. Id.; see Durham v. Barrow, 600 S.W.2d 756, 760-61 (Tex. 1980) (discussion of re-
strictions on powers of guardian ad litem).
252. 632 S.W.2d at 758.
253. Id. at 759.
254. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 13.21(c), 14.07, 15.01, 15.02(2), 16.08(a) (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1982-1983).
255. See Edwards v. Edwards, 624 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ) (appellate court modified a final judgment, which had not been appealed,
because trial court had exceeded its powers in the original decision). For a discussion of
Edwards see supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
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